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Games and Family Resemblances
Consider for example the proceedings that we call "games". I
mean board-games, card-games, ball-games, Olympic games, and so
on.  What is common to them all?  Don't say: "There must be
something common, or they would not be called 'games'"-- but look
and see whether there is anything common to all.-- For if you
look at them you will not see something that is common to all,
but similarities, relationships, and a whole series of them at
that. To repeat: don't think, but look!-- Look for example at
board-games, with their multifarious relationships.  Now pass to
card-games; here you find many correspondences with the first
group, but many common features drop out, and others appear. When
we pass next to ball games, much that is common is retained, but
much is lost.-- Are they all 'amusing'? Compare chess with
noughts and crosses.  Or is there always winning and losing, or
competition between players? think of patience.  In ball games
there is winning and losing; but when a child throws his ball at
the wall and catches it again, this feature has disappeared. Look
at the parts played by skill and luck; and at the difference
between skill in chess and skill in tennis.  Think now of games
like ring-a-round-a roses; here is the element of amusement, but
how many other characteristic features have disappeared!...
I can think of no better expression to characterize these
similarities than "family resemblances";... And I shall say:
'games' form a family.1
Ludwig Wittgenstein, 1953
Even at the ordinary-language level, it is strange to say
that all games "have something in common," namely, being games.
For some games involve winning and losing, others ("Ring a Ring
o'Roses") do not; some games are played for the amusement of the
players, others (gladatorial games) are not; some games have more
than one player, others do not; and so on. In the same way, when
we examine closely all the cases in which we would say that
someone has "referred to" something...., we do not find any one
relation between the word and the thing referred to.2
Hilary Putnam, 1988
The doctrine of family resemblances is tied in a peculiar
way to the particular example of games. For although the doctrine
has become part of the arsenal of analytic philosophy, on the
occasions when philosophers feel a need to support it, the
2example of games is what is supposed to clinch the matter. No one
gives Wittgenstein's second example, numbers, probably because it
is so unpersuasive. Other examples that philosophers sometimes
proffer, for instance, "party," "spot," "train," seem easy enough
to define and too slight to matter. More weighty and interesting
examples, for instance, "religion," "justice," "reference," are
controversial, for there are theories purporting to explain what
all just acts or societies, say, have in common; and even if we
are unsatisfied with such theories, there remains a real
possibility that we may find the true account if we look further.
Hence philosophically interesting examples will persuade only if
we have already accepted the doctrine of family resemblances on
other grounds. As a matter of historical fact, the argument for
the doctrine has gone: 
The word "game" cannot be defined by a common feature of games,
for obviously there is none. We call something a "game" because
of its relationship with several things we have called games; we
extend our concept along these various resemblances "as in
spinning a thread we twist fibre on fibre," with no fibre running
through its whole length.3 This is what explains our concept
"game"and, probably, a host of other philosophically interesting
terms, e.g., "number," "reference,"  "religion," and so on. 
A good way to cast serious doubt on the doctrine, consequently,
is to say what is common to games. After all, if the doctrine
fails for its most impressive and persuasive example, why believe
it?  Wittgenstein would owe us new arguments, at the least. That
is what I propose to do in this paper. 
Wittgenstein's injunction, "Don't think, but look!" is an
invitation to miss the forest for the trees. Of course, if you
look at games without thinking "you will not see something common
3to them all, but similarities, relationships, and a whole series
of them at that." Let's disobey the fatal injunction, and look
and think both. A promising place to seek the essence of games is
within the class of rule-defined activities, that is, activities
it would be impossible to perform without following rules.4 So,
for example, we could eat, run, and fight without following
rules, but we couldn't play chess, bridge, or basketball. Even if
monkeys pushed about chess pieces in a way that duplicated a
chess game, they would not be playing chess unless they were
following the rules of chess. 
Of course, there are rule-defined activities that aren't
games. Speaking a language, for example (pace Wittgenstein). What
makes a rule-defined activity a game? I propose the following
theory: A game is a rule-defined activity involving a state which
counts as performing the activity successfully because it is so
defined by an arbitrary rule, an activity typically performed for
the recreation of participants or spectators, or to sharpen
skills. This is what all and only games share in virtue of which
they are games; also, I believe this account pretty well captures
our ordinary concept of games. To put the matter roughly, games
are rule-defined play, where success is created by an arbitrary
rule.5
Chess, to take an obvious example, is a rule-defined
activity involving a state (checkmate) that counts as success
because it is so defined by a rule, and chess is typically played
for the recreation of participants or spectators or to sharpen
4skills. Notice that checkmate isn't success because we strive for
it; rather, we strive for checkmate because, according to the
rules, it is success. Games have the feature that the success
state is in this way internal to the rules. The immediate object
of a game is to accomplish the state the rules define as success
because it is so defined. Note too that you can play chess but
not succeed, as when you play but fail to checkmate. To win a
game you must play successfully a game that can be played without
succeeding.
The example of chess also illustrates the way in which the
rule that defines playing a game successfully is arbitrary. We
often ask two questions when learning to play a game: "How do I
play?" and "What counts as winning?" These questions are
different. Knowing how to move the chess pieces according to the
rules isn't knowing what counts as winning; indeed, the set of
rules that tell me how to move the pieces is compatible with an
indefinite number of definitions of winning (e.g., checkmate,
taking all your opponents pieces except his king, queening three
pawns, etc.)  These rules do not determine the success state.
Hence the rule defining success is an arbitrary addition in that
we could have adopted, consistent with all the other rules, a
different definition of success.  
Consider the child throwing a ball against a wall and
catching it again. Where this activity is a game, the child is
following a rule like: "Throw the ball against the wall and catch
it, where success is catching the ball you've thrown against the
5wall."6 A feature of many children's games is that the activity
which is the playing of the game is also what is defined by the
rule as succeeding. As the activity is usually easy so is
performing it successfully, one of the reasons such games provide
so much pleasure for children and so little for adults. The rule
for Ring around O' Roses is: "You and your colleagues hold hands
and run in a circle chanting 'Ring a round o' Roses.... All fall
down'; and all fall down roughly when you sing "All fall down',
which is succeeding." Where the very activity that constitutes
the game is defined as succeeding, there is success but no
winning. Note, however, that in each case we could have adopted
different definitions of success consistent with the remaining
rules, e.g., "Success is catching the ball twenty times in a row"
in the first case, and "Success is being the first (or second, or
last) player to reach the ground" in the second. 
This theory of games explains our ambivalence toward calling
sports like boxing "games." Imagine the announcer at a prizefight
shouting: "He's up, he's down, he's up again! What a terrific
game this is, folks!" Yet boxing is included among the Olympic
games. Our ambivalence isn't simply because boxing is violent. We
have no trouble calling football, rugby, and lacrosse games. Our
definition, recall, requires that a game involves a state which
counts as success because it is so defined by a rule. Fighting,
of course, isn't rule defined. And knocking out your opponent in
a brawl is success because that is the goal of a brawl, not
because a rule says so. Plainly we made brawling into a sport by
6crafting the rules of boxing to count as success pretty much what
is success in a brawl, rules or no. When we view boxing as a
game, we must think that a knockout counts as winning because the
rule says so. A knockout would be losing if the rule was
different. But we also recognize that the rule defines a knockout
as winning the fight because it is winning the fight.
Consequently we are ambivalent as to whether the success state
counts as success because it is so defined by a rule.7
Our theory captures the point of the jibe: "Philosophy is
just a game." The point is that what counts as success in
philosophy has no independent validity or value; it counts as
succeeding solely because an arbitrary rule says so. If the rule
had been different, something else would count as success. And,
according to the jibe, philosophers go for the success state
simply because they know it is so defined, not because they are
interested in any extrinsic value, for example, truth. 
Perhaps the theory sheds some light on the point of
Wittgenstein's treatment of language as a collection of "language
games." The Augustinian account of language acquisition assumes
that human creatures have the natural ability to think about
things, that is, to mentally represent objects in the world, plus
the ability to transfer the contents of thoughts to words. A
language, on this view, is essentially a system of sounds with
derived intentionality, used to communicate information about how
the world stands.8  As Wittgenstein observes: "Augustine
describes the learning of a human language as if... the child
7could already think, only not yet speak."9 If language is made of
games, however, what counts as success in playing a language game
has no independent or external value or validity; succeeding is
wholly internal to the game, which is what defines success.
Consequently there is no natural intentionality we transfer to
words, the ability to think about things, that determines
linguistic success, the ability to talk about things. Augustine
is mistaken. The meanings of words can be determined only by
their use in a language game. And rules have no derived
intentionality to determine how games are played: the meaning of
a rule is determined by how it is applied, not the reverse. At
bottom, then, intentionality is determined wholly by practices,
what we actually say and do. If language is made of games then
intentionality is determined by behaviour, a consequence from
which Wittgenstein's most striking conclusions flow, for example,
that there can be no private language.
What of objections and counter-examples?  Consider board
games like Monopoly and Gettysburg, which try to craft success in
the game so as to mirror winning in a pre-existing competition.
If the theory is true, shouldn't we feel at least some of the
ambivalence about counting these as games that we feel about
boxing? Yet we don't. We might call such pastimes
"Representational games": each game is fundamentally an
uninterpreted system--bits of wood, coloured squares, and so on--
to which a level of representational content is added. But the
game could be played uninterpreted. (Consider how we might
8interpret backgammon in various ways.) At this fundamental level
of description, winning is wholly rule created: a certain
arrangement of bits of wood is winning because the rules say it
is. There is no pre-existing competition with bits of wood to
which the rules are crafted. Hence representational games are
clearly games. But in boxing, there is a pre-existing competition
that proceeds at the fundamental level of the game, to which the
rules are crafted:  competitors are banging away at each other in
both cases. Hence our ambivalence.
What about passing the time by trying to solve arithmetical
problems and puzzles? This isn't a game, but doesn't it satisfy
the definition?  Necessarily, solving a problem or a puzzle just
is getting the right answer; therefore the arithmetical rules
that determine the right answers define what counts as performing
the activity successfully. Remember, however, that the rule that
defines playing a game successfully is an arbitrary addition,
undetermined by the other rules. What counts as playing a game
successfully is, in a certain sense, made up out of thin air. But
we could not, consistent with the remaining rules, have adopted 
different right answers to the arithmetical problems, declaring
these to be the solutions. For instance, we could not coherently
define 5 as the sum of 2+2, while leaving the remaining rules
unchanged. If a rule defines the right answer to a mathematical
problem, it is not an arbitrary rule. Hence solving arithmetical
puzzles for pleasure is not a game. We could, of course, adopt
such a rule, e.g., "Success is solving five problems on the first
9try in five minutes," in which case we would be playing a game.10
What about reading for pleasure? I follow various rules when
I do, and these determine what it is to succeed at reading. Yet
reading certainly isn't a game. Here it is helpful to distinguish
succeeding at performing an activity, that is, managing to
perform it simpliciter, from performing the activity
successfully. Consider, for example, the difference between a
child succeeding at playing chess, that is, playing chess, and
her playing chess successfully, that is, winning. But note too
that there are cases where the distinction fails to apply: how
does walking successfully differ from succeeding at walking, that
is, simply walking? The trouble is that talk of "walking
successfully" has been given no definite sense; we don't know
what walking "successfully" would be. By contrast, talk of
playing games successfully has a clear and robust sense,
precisely because each game must involve a state explicitly
defined by a rule as playing the game successfully. Even in the
special case where the activity that counts as playing the game
is what is defined by the rule as playing the game successfully,
talk of playing the game successfully has a definite sense. (I
have often played Ring Around O' Roses, always successfully.)
This helps sort out the alleged counter-instance. Plainly
the fact that rules determine what it is to perform an activity
simpliciter hardly entails that a rule explicitly defines some
state as performing that activity successfully.11 For instance,
the rules I follow when I read determine what it is to read; but
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talk of "reading successfully" has no more sense than "walking
successfully." We don't know what reading "successfully" would
be. Hence there is, in fact, no state explicitly defined by a
rule as reading successfully. Consequently reading for pleasure
isn't a game. Of course, we could adopt such a rule (e.g.,
"Reading successfully is reading aloud at the rate of 100 words a
minute with no mistakes"), in which case we would be playing a
game.
Why isn't waltzing a game by our definition? To waltz
successfully, it is, of course, necessary to waltz.12 But that
isn't sufficient. Successful waltzing is waltzing with grace,
ease, and beauty. And I submit it is just obvious that beautiful
waltzing isn't successful because a rule says it is. The dance is
a kind of raw material which is used as a medium to realize
aesthetic features, in much the way that clay is sculpted to
manifest such properties. It is because we value grace and beauty
that we create various mediums for their realization. Beauty is
success in waltzing because we strive for beauty; we do not
strive for beauty because it is defined as success by a rule.
(Contrast a straight line of markers in Bingo.) Of course, we
could adopt such a rule, in which case waltzing would be a game,
as in (heaven forbid!) a waltzing contest. 
Wittgenstein writes: 
But if someone wished to say: "There is something common to all
these constructions--namely the disjunction of all their common
properties"-- I should  reply: Now you are only playing with
words.  You might as well say: "Something runs through the whole
thread-- namely the continuous overlapping of those fibres".13 
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But a game, on our account, is typically played for the
recreation of participants or spectators or to sharpen skills.
Isn't this the sort of disjunctive definition Wittgenstein
explicitly rejects? Well, no. First, all games must share the
feature of being rule-defined activities involving a state that
counts as performing the activity successfully because an
arbitrary rule so defines it. Plainly Wittgenstein has in mind a
more radical disjunction, where there is no important commonality
and games share only the disjunction of different properties.
Second, the disjuncts themselves have something in common,
namely, they reflect the fact that success in games is created by
an arbitrary rule. We do not typically play a game because we
consider its success state intrinsically valuable, nor do we play
it because its success state has pre-existing causal connections
to other states we value. We create a rule-defined success state
and pursue it, not because it has intrinsic value or pre-existing
instrumental value, but because we value the pursuit. 
Then why not omit the disjunctive condition from the
definition? If we lived in a world where legal suits were settled
by chess, believing that God would allow only the innocent party
to checkmate, and this was the only venue for chess, we would not
consider chess a game nor would we consider such endeavours
play.14 In fact, games are not essentially games, a feature our
theory preserves.
To conclude: the doctrine of family resemblances remains
alive and influential in analytic philosophy, as the quotation
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1. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, Third
Edition, G.E.M. Anscombe translator, (Basil Blackwell,
1958),entries 66 and 67. Emphasis in the original.
2. Hilary Putnam, Representation and Reality, (MIT Press, 1988),
p. 3. Emphasis in the original.
3. The quotation here is from Wittgenstein, 67. The rest of the
sentence containing the quotation closely paraphrases
Wittgenstein, 67, except that he is talking about numbers.
4.  Rule-defined activities are first discussed in John Rawls,
from Hilary Putnam illustrates. I believe the doctrine has had an
especially pernicious influence on disciplines closely related to
philosophy, for example, philosophical theology, where it has
become a kind of othodoxy.15 I confess to a congenital prejudice
against the various siren voices calling us to abandon the
traditional philosophical enterprise. I hear them singing sweetly
beyond the breakers: "Mariner, why seek the nature of numbers,
intentionality, reference, religion, when they have none?" This
paper is meant to provide a particularly relevant example of why
we should keep looking. Failing better arguments, I propose that
we tie ourselves to the mast and sail on.16 
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